Risks and rewards of a US-ASEAN special summit

Washington must avoid imposing its technology standards or demanding that ASEAN countries exclusively align with the US.

When major global powers engage with regional blocs, there's usually a strategic purpose. This applies to Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's proposal to United States President Donald Trump for a special ASEAN-US summit. 

ASEAN likely welcomes the chance to engage with the US in a high-level summit format, similar to past US-ASEAN Leaders' Summits. However, like any meeting between nations with unequal power, this summit carries strategic risks and potential rewards whose full extent is hard to predict. We can only make educated guesses about the implications. 

The summit's timing, set against a backdrop of growing global rivalries, symbolism and how it's strategically presented will be crucial in determining if it strengthens or weakens ASEAN’s valued principle of neutrality. 

First, it's important to acknowledge the ongoing fundamental differences in how the US and ASEAN view their relationship. Washington has often perceived ASEAN as a tool, a strategically located hub in the wider Indo-Pacific, important more for its geography than its intrinsic qualities. 

Since the Nixon and Guam Doctrines of the 1970s, the US has encouraged regional allies to take on more security responsibilities, offering support based on its changing priorities. Under a second Trump administration, this approach will likely continue, but with increased demands for defense spending from allies, a focus on bilateral economic gains for the US and little tolerance for complex multilateral diplomacy. 

In this context, a special summit would highlight both shared and conflicting priorities. The US aims to strengthen an informal Indo-Pacific coalition to counter China's increasing influence. ASEAN, however, strives to avoid being pulled into this direct US-China rivalry. ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific emphasizes inclusivity, cooperation, and openness. 

Therefore, a key risk is that ASEAN could be seen as, or pressured into, aligning with a US-led bloc, which would jeopardize its fundamental principle of non-alignment. 

Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand have already voiced concerns about what they see as an increasing militarization of regional diplomacy. A hypothetical call by the US defense secretary for Asian allies to boost defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, similar to NATO targets, sounds more like a demand than a suggestion. 

However, dismissing the summit entirely would also be a mistake. A potential diplomatic benefit is the chance to refocus the US-ASEAN relationship on more than just security issues. 

If approached correctly, the summit could prioritize economic recovery, climate change cooperation and building technological resilience, areas where ASEAN's development goals match US capabilities. 

Unlike the Biden administration that showed interest in partnering on these issues, Trump is expected to insist on individual ASEAN member states negotiating separate trade deals with the US. 

The challenge for ASEAN, then, is to collectively guide the summit toward concrete results, particularly in preventing high US tariffs and to avoid what could feel like an exploitative negotiation by the Trump administration. President Trump should avoid over-pressuring ASEAN member states to make concessions aimed at reducing US trade deficits. 

Instead, the US should consider supporting ASEAN-led initiatives like the Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC). These frameworks offer a solid foundation for ASEAN's development over the next two decades. 

Washington would benefit from supporting these existing ASEAN initiatives rather than suggesting alternative ones. Specifically, assisting ASEAN's digital economy, in areas like data governance, cross-border payments, cybersecurity and AI regulation, could bring substantial economic and strategic benefits to all parties. 

This support would also help balance China’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia's digital infrastructure through its Digital Silk Road initiative. However, Washington must avoid imposing its technology standards or demanding that ASEAN countries exclusively align with the US. 

If the summit takes place, it will be an opportunity to address the critical issue of high tariffs. President Trump has renewed fears of another global tariff war. Countries like Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand, which export significantly to the US, are particularly vulnerable to unpredictable tariff changes. 

At the summit, ASEAN could advocate for a system to ensure more predictable and transparent US tariff policies. While a full free trade agreement is improbable, restarting talks under a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) or establishing a US-ASEAN Economic Cooperation Council could indicate a commitment to stronger economic ties. Washington should consider promoting free trade, especially since it has a trade surplus with countries like Malaysia and Singapore. 

Another potential benefit for ASEAN is the opportunity to use the summit to demonstrate its "centrality" in the region. This concept means more than just hosting meetings; it involves shaping agendas, defining the terms of discussion and preventing external influences from weakening ASEAN's internal unity. 

The summit's public perception and inclusivity are also important. With Timor-Leste set to join ASEAN and Papua New Guinea increasingly viewed as connected to the bloc from the Pacific, ASEAN's regional scope is expanding. The US needs to show it acknowledges this broader scope, including the integration of newer, developing economies. 

Furthermore, the US-ASEAN Summit cannot overlook the situation in Myanmar. Although Myanmar's military junta is excluded from high-level ASEAN meetings, the crisis there continues to worsen. The US should use the summit to support ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, provide logistical and humanitarian aid for ASEAN-led peace initiatives, and refrain from independent actions that could fragment regional diplomatic efforts. This would bolster ASEAN's role as a regional stabilizing force and improve US credibility. 

Nevertheless, there's a significant risk of misunderstanding each other's strategic intentions. The US might see ASEAN's participation as unspoken support for its China containment strategy. Meanwhile, ASEAN leaders might view the summit as a way to maintain their flexible, non-committal stance. These different interpretations could lead to unmet expectations and disappointment for both. 

Even worse, ASEAN might unintentionally appear divided, particularly if some members openly side with the US while others try to balance their relationships or lean toward China. Such divisions would weaken ASEAN's ability to act together and defeat the summit's purpose. 

Finally, the greatest risk is symbolic. The summit could become a mere transactional event. If the US offers only vague strategic statements, repeated old promises or unclear commitments, it will confirm suspicions in Southeast Asian capitals that ASEAN is just a pawn in a larger power play. 

ASEAN leaders must avoid being lulled into inaction by diplomatic pleasantries. Instead, they should press for definite outcomes, mutually advantageous projects, and enduring institutional connections. Only then can this special summit achieve its stated goals. 

Ultimately, the success of any US-ASEAN special summit will hinge on a clear purpose and genuine commitment from both sides. If it's simply another effort to pull ASEAN away from China, it is likely to fail. However, if the summit respects ASEAN’s independence in foreign policy, supports its development goals, and addresses shared concerns, it could pave the way for a new, more balanced phase in US-ASEAN relations. In today's unstable geopolitical environment, such a balance is not just preferred, it is crucial.

Source: The Jakarta Post