ASEAN members balance with BRICS as the world shifts

Southeast Asian nations are increasingly interested in the BRICS association, aiming to diversify their diplomatic and economic partnerships. But this potentially challenges ASEAN's unity and centrality. While Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam see benefits in terms of economic growth, trade diversification, and access to the New Development Bank, the move could also lead to marginalisation and disadvantages for ASEAN countries not included in BRICS. Given potential complications for ASEAN trade commitments, this could shift the region's geopolitics as Western nations may perceive the alignment as move towards China and Russia.

Southeast Asian nations’ interest in BRICS signifies a strategic recalibration in response to the complexities of a multipolar and uncertain world. Indonesia’s admission to BRICS in January 2025, alongside Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam joining as partner countries in October 2024, exemplifies the region’s pragmatic approach to diversifying diplomatic and economic partnerships. While this alignment presents opportunities, it may challenge ASEAN’s cohesion and principle of centrality.

BRICS offers alternative opportunities for economic growth, trade diversification and access to development financing. For Indonesia, BRICS membership strengthens its connections with major economies such as China and India while providing access to the New Development Bank. President Prabowo Subianto’s statement, ‘a thousand friends are too few; one enemy is too many’, underscores Indonesia’s commitment to fostering diverse partnerships.

Malaysia sees BRICS as a platform to strengthen its renewable energy and technology sectors. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim clarified that Malaysia’s engagement is not about aligning with any bloc but rather adapting to global changes. He also emphasised that the rise of China presents a ‘glimmer of hope’ for balancing global power dynamics.

With BRICS countries accounting for 22.8 per cent of international trade, Thailand views membership as an opportunity for foreign direct investment and access to new markets. Vietnam intends to remain a BRICS partner country, a ‘sweet spot’, to enhance its economic cooperation and diversify its international partnerships, aiming to balance its relationships between Western nations and emerging economies.

Amid these developments, ASEAN’s principle of centrality may be at risk. Concerns regarding its cohesion have intensified as these countries pursue closer ties with BRICS. These concerns centre on its strategic neutrality and internal unity. ASEAN’s alignment with BRICS could draw some member states closer to China and Russia, complicating its broader geopolitical stance.

ASEAN members not included in BRICS risk marginalisation and face economic and developmental disadvantages, as BRICS offers exclusive financing and trade benefits, including the New Development Bank’s lending facilities. Indonesia’s accession to BRICS could facilitate Russian oil imports on more advantageous terms, potentially disadvantaging non-BRICS Southeast Asian nations. The enthusiasm of certain ASEAN members to join BRICS also reflects scepticism regarding ASEAN’s effectiveness in further promoting intraregional trade, particularly given the persistent non-tariff barriers imposed by larger ASEAN countries.

ASEAN’s engagement with BRICS continues to be motivated by economic considerations, with some analysts suggesting that its centrality will endure. Overlapping memberships may enable the involved ASEAN countries to hedge risks in an uncertain geopolitical landscape. The long-term impact on ASEAN cohesion will depend on how BRICS evolves.

The geopolitical implications of Southeast Asia’s engagement with BRICS extend beyond the region. The United States and its allies may view this alignment as a shift toward China and Russia. Beijing’s push for BRICS expansion aligns with its broader vision of a new world order that challenges Western dominance. While Southeast Asian BRICS participants emphasise their commitment to balanced foreign policies, intensifying US–China posturing complicates these relationships.

Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency exacerbates these dynamics with renewed tariff policies, including a 10 per cent tariff on China, leading to retaliatory measures, including tariffs, export controls on critical minerals and an antitrust probe into Google and US firms. Meanwhile, Trump’s restrictive immigration policies, particularly proposed changes to H-1B visas, risk straining US–India relations. This may undermine the future of the Quad alliance in the Indo-Pacific.

As these economic and geopolitical uncertainties escalate, ASEAN nations may further diversify their partnerships, rendering BRICS’ emphasis on equitable development and access to the New Development Bank an increasingly attractive alternative.

Despite its economic advantages, BRICS membership could complicate ASEAN trade commitments as BRICS nations explore alternative financial and trade systems that may diverge from the RCEP and CPTPP frameworks. Russia’s proposed BRICS cross-border payment system, which utilises blockchain to facilitate transactions in national currencies, aims to reduce reliance on the US dollar but may conflict with ASEAN’s existing financial infrastructure. Russia’s proposal to establish a grain trading exchange could introduce parallel trade mechanisms and potentially necessitate policy adjustments for ASEAN to maintain market compatibility while balancing global economic shifts.

An ‘ASEAN+BRICS’ strategy could address these challenges by integrating BRICS-related policies into ASEAN’s broader regional agenda. Malaysia’s chairmanship of ASEAN presents a strategic opportunity to explore synergies between BRICS and ASEAN, particularly in trade, investment and infrastructure development. This approach would help maintain ASEAN’s unity and centrality while leveraging BRICS partnerships to promote shared priorities such as infrastructure expansion, climate resilience, digital transformation and equitable trade.

Existing ASEAN platforms, including the ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Ministerial Meetings and ASEAN Economic Ministers Meetings, could serve as venues to align BRICS initiatives with ASEAN’s objectives. Inviting the BRICS chair country to these discussions, as a first step, could further enhance cooperation and coordination.

Transparent diplomacy and open communication are essential for ASEAN to maintain its credibility while engaging with BRICS and Western powers. To uphold neutrality and a balanced multipolar approach, ASEAN should enhance its internal coordination, under the leadership of the ASEAN Chair, to better align BRICS-related activities with its strategic priorities.

Source: East Asia Forum